Fall or Spring This course investigates auctions and markets. Part analytical, part experimental, and partly data driven, it shows how the outcomes of different auction and trading mechanisms depend on the characteristics of the bidders and traders, the bidding or trading rules, and the information that the traders have. The course makes extensive use of Comlabgames to simulate the various types of auctions and markets we analyze. It is divided into four roughly equal parts. Part 1 is an introduction to limit order markets, and a detailed study of auctions, arguably the simplest market form. Part 2 extends our analysis of auction to monopoly, which differs from the simplest auctions because multiple units are sold and the monopolist can restrict sales. In he third part we investigate the effects of adding sellers and buyers to both sides of the market. Finally we extend our analysis to multi-market settings, such as stock exchanges, and use the concept of competitive equilibrium to predict behavior in limit order markets. (Lecture, 3 hours)
Fall or Spring This course investigates auctions and markets. Part analytical, part experimental, and partly data driven, it shows how the outcomes of different auction and trading mechanisms depend on the characteristics of the bidders and traders, the bidding or trading rules, and the information that the traders have. The course makes extensive use of Comlabgames to simulate the various types of auctions and markets we analyze. It is divided into four roughly equal parts. Part 1 is an introduction to limit order markets, and a detailed study of auctions, arguably the simplest market form. Part 2 extends our analysis of auction to monopoly, which differs from the simplest auctions because multiple units are sold and the monopolist can restrict sales. In he third part we investigate the effects of adding sellers and buyers to both sides of the market. Finally we extend our analysis to multi-market settings, such as stock exchanges, and use the concept of competitive equilibrium to predict behavior in limit order markets. (Lecture, 3 hours)
Fall or Spring This course investigates auctions and markets. Part analytical, part experimental, and partly data driven, it shows how the outcomes of different auction and trading mechanisms depend on the characteristics of the bidders and traders, the bidding or trading rules, and the information that the traders have. The course makes extensive use of Comlabgames to simulate the various types of auctions and markets we analyze. It is divided into four roughly equal parts. Part 1 is an introduction to limit order markets, and a detailed study of auctions, arguably the simplest market form. Part 2 extends our analysis of auction to monopoly, which differs from the simplest auctions because multiple units are sold and the monopolist can restrict sales. In he third part we investigate the effects of adding sellers and buyers to both sides of the market. Finally we extend our analysis to multi-market settings, such as stock exchanges, and use the concept of competitive equilibrium to predict behavior in limit order markets. (Lecture, 3 hours)
Fall or Spring This course investigates auctions and markets. Part analytical, part experimental, and partly data driven, it shows how the outcomes of different auction and trading mechanisms depend on the characteristics of the bidders and traders, the bidding or trading rules, and the information that the traders have. The course makes extensive use of Comlabgames to simulate the various types of auctions and markets we analyze. It is divided into four roughly equal parts. Part 1 is an introduction to limit order markets, and a detailed study of auctions, arguably the simplest market form. Part 2 extends our analysis of auction to monopoly, which differs from the simplest auctions because multiple units are sold and the monopolist can restrict sales. In he third part we investigate the effects of adding sellers and buyers to both sides of the market. Finally we extend our analysis to multi-market settings, such as stock exchanges, and use the concept of competitive equilibrium to predict behavior in limit order markets. (Lecture, 3 hours)
